African Jubilee Mau Mau Resurgence and the Fight For Fertility in Kenya, 1986-2002 Terisa E. Turner and Leigh Brownhill 2001 Part One: Promised Land We were cheated by the white man with a bible that we should not have things here on earth but we should
wait for those things that were promised in heaven. So, the Africans were being tormented and harassed
because they were to wait until the day came for us to go up and inherit the things that were prophesied, while
the white man could stay here and enjoy the things of the world. Jomo [Kenyatta, c. 1946] went ahead and
wanted to broaden the Africans' minds. He said that since we were told to wait for those things that were up
there in heaven, and the white man was the one who went up into the sky in airplanes, why doesn't he go up
there and inherit everything that is up there and leave the others for the Africans? (First Woman, Elizabeth
wa Gatengwa,15 January 1997).(1)
We [in Muungano wa Wanavijiji, Organization of Villagers] have followed what the Mau Mau were fighting
for, because they were fighting for land, and we are also fighting for land. Because the reason we have so
many slum dwellers in Nairobi, is lack of land. And if you ask the slum dwellers, you will find that their
parents were Mau Mau fighters. Their people are the ones who were in the forest and yet they didn't get land
or anything. And they are the ones who are now spread all over. So we want everyone to be given land and
to be given assurance of owning this land (First Woman, Sabina Wanjiku, 25 July 1998). There is a resurgence of struggle over land in Kenya. Fighters 'who are now spread all over,' have
taken up the unfinished business of the Mau Mau which began 50 years ago in 1952. Land
occupations in the new millennium are part of a new cycle of struggle by the dispossessed in response
to the new enclosures of the commons by corporate 'globalization from above.' Kenya in 2002 is characterized by a politics of land which is as intense and conflict ridden now as it
was fifty years ago when the Kenya Land and Freedom Army, or Mau Mau, engaged British
colonialists and African loyalist 'Homeguards' in battles over control of land. Land, in Kenya, is
power. And though there has been an almost unceasing struggle over land throughout the twentieth
century, this struggle has seen quiet times and periods of extreme upheaval. The armed struggle for
independence in the 1950s is clearly one period of upheaval. We identify a new period of upheaval
beginning around 1986 and intensifying into the year 2002. Why, after forty years of Kenyan
independence, has there arisen a new Mau Mau and a new round of conflagration over land? Sisule wrote of the 2001 Kenyan land conflicts that, There is a perennial joke that an average Kenyan abhors free, open space and would not hesitate to occupy
such land even if it belongs to somebody else. Of course this is only true in the case of the land grabbing types,
who sometimes disguise themselves as genuine private developers. Land is a vital resource for abode and
production activities and its ownership is an emotive issue (Sisule, 8 October 2001). It is necessary to distinguish between those commonly known in Kenya as 'land grabbers,' who are
wealthy people aspiring to make commercial gain from the privatization of public land, and those we
call 'land occupiers,' who are dispossessed people who assert land entitlements to public land and idle
privately owned land. While dramatizing the fact that struggle over land is a key issue in the 21st century, Sisule does not
say why. Why now? The answer to this question is intimately tied up with the introduction of World
Bank structural adjustment programs, beginning in 1980. Before outlining the types of land
occupations occurring in Kenya today, and defining some of our key concepts, we examine, briefly,
three aspects of structural adjustment programmes which bear upon the increase in conflicts over
land. These are, first, the fast-tracking of election-focused 'political pluralism,' which has manifest
itself in Kenya in a fully commodified form in which money and land titles(2) are exchanged for votes;
second, the privatization of state assets, which puts in place a justification for the corrupt allocation
of urban and rural spaces; and third, the de-funding of health and education, which increases the need
among the poor for access to land on which to subsist and earn an independent livelihood. Since the government was forced to concede to multipartyism in 1991, some 400,000 Kenyans have been
systematically attacked and displaced from their homes by state-sponsored violence targeting ethnic groups
perceived to support the political opposition. The role of known high-ranking government officials, who
remain unpunished, in instigating, inflaming, and financing this violence has been widely documented, not
only by national and international human rights NGOs, but also by the government's own parliamentary select
committee (which consisted of only ruling party members) (Human Rights Watch 2001). Multiparty politics emerged in Kenya in the early 1990s as a result of two conflicting but interrelated
phenomena. First, in the mid 1980s, transport workers attempted to form a union. They held several
strikes which paralyzed regional trade for short periods. Autonomous action by transport workers
meant that the state could not control the economy. The government banned unionization in the
transportation sector. At the same time, the small scale farmers of coffee tore out their trees and
planted food crops for local consumption. They did so because the prices on the world market had
fallen and at the same time, state corruption in the allocation of coffee incomes enriched state
managers and impoverished rural producers. With the drop in foreign exchange earnings from coffee
sales, the state fell into a balance of payments crisis by the end of the 1980s. The World Bank was
concerned about the fiscal crisis and conflated the growing resistance through economic disruption
by transport workers and small farmers with the increasingly vociferous demands for multiparty
democracy. The World Bank offered Moi an ultimatum in December 1991: repeal the section of the
Constitution which made Kenya a single party state or lose financial assistance from the World Bank
and International Monetary Fund, as well as from the 'Paris Club' of donors which took its cues from
the Bretton Woods institutions. Within days, Moi capitulated. He was not so willing, however, to
allow voters to decide the political future of the country on their own. In 2001, Hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons remained unable to return after being driven from their
homes in state-sponsored attacks since 1991 directed against members of ethnic groups perceived to support
the political opposition. The authorities continued during the year to fail to provide adequate security to those
who sought to return to their homes under assurances of safety, nor were land titles restored to those who were
wrongfully deprived. Nor had the government held those responsible for the violence accountable. In 1999,
a presidential Commission on the Ethnic Clashes wound up after eleven months of hearing evidence,
including from Human Rights Watch, about the violence between 1991 and 1998. As of October 2000, the
commission's findings had still not been released, though the completed report had been submitted to the
president over a year before (Human Rights Watch, World Report 2001). Behind the increasing competition for land in the public sphere was structural adjustment's insistence
on privatization, or as the 2001 winner of the Nobel Prize for Economics and ex-World Bank chief
economist, Joseph Stiglitz, calls it, "briberization-privatization."(3) In Kenya in 1994, about 2.5 million
hectares, or 20% to 25% of the most arable land, was owned by large scale farmers (Foeken and
Tellegen 1994:3). On these large farms, hundreds of thousands of acres lay idle. Thousands of
Kenyans live as agricultural labourers on these estates, or nearby in squatter communities on public
land. Those Kenyans who own small farms or occupy communally owned land are situated,
economically and socially, between the large land owners and the landless, who squat on rural land
or make their livelihoods in urban slums. Squatters on public land in urban areas live in substandard
accommodation, which they either build from scavenged cardboard and flattened tin cans or rent from
landlords who have no legal title to the land. In 2001, slumdwellers defied landlords by asserting collective rights to housing plots. Nairobi's
Kibera slum houses more than 700,000 people (Otieno 4 December 2001). In an October 2001 public
address, Kenya's President Moi acknowledged the problem of landlords charging exorbitant rents for
slum houses: "most of the semi-permanent residential houses stand on State land and the landlords
pay nothing to the Government, yet they are fleecing the tenants. These people own the land illegally
and in fact they should be prosecuted. As of now we will not do that, but they have to ensure that
they charge reasonable rents." (Openda 1 November 2001). Within a month, urban villagers in Kibera
acted on Moi's delegitimization of fake slumlords who "should be prosecuted." The slum dwellers
"organised themselves into a tenants' association, and vowed to halt rent payments until the
Provincial Commissioner issued new guidelines" (Gaitho 20 November 2001). Landlords refused to
lower rents and called in police to disperse the tenants, who gathered daily for rallies and discussions.
Ten days later, on 30 November, the Daily Nation reported that Tenants of the sprawling Kibera slum in Nairobi began to flee their homes yesterday, amid claims of rampant
looting and rape by police. ... A middle aged woman said she was forced to strip and was molested by
policemen, but was not raped. Other tenants said they saw women being raped in some bars but the victims
were not willing to speak of their ordeal (Thuku 30 November 2001). Government Ministers proposed rent cuts to avert the spread of the rent strikes. Landlords offered
a 20 per cent reduction. Tenants insisted on a 50 per cent cut (Otieno 4 December 2001). Three
quarters of a million slum dwellers, through their tenants' organization, decided autonomously the
value of their accommodation. Auto-valuation of rents was combined with self-taxing. Many Kibera
slum dwellers each paid ten shillings a month to Mungiki (Congress) and formed community defense
posses against police attack. Poor living conditions in the slums and in rural areas are accompanied by poor health and education.
The Archbishop of the Anglican Church of Kenya, Dr. David Gitari, holds the government
responsible for the poverty and ill health resulting from the de-funding of schools and medical centres.
Dr. Gitari decried the fact that child mortality rates had "increased from 62 per 1000 live births in
1988-1993 to 74 children per 1000 live births in 1998." The mortality rate of children under five
years of age had also shot up. "During the first two decades after independence [1963-1983], there
was an improvement in the health status of the population with a marked decline in mortality and
morbidity rates and increase in life expectancy, an achievement the Government has been unable to
improve or sustain" (Oywa 8 October 2001). Despite grinding poverty and repression, millions of
peasants produce food and hundreds of thousands of land-poor and landless people process and trade
it in rural and urban areas of the country. The persistence of this subsistence political economy has
ensured that most of the population is supplied with at least the bare necessities, which in turn allows
them to struggle to increase their control over land and their own lives. The struggle for land in this new period of upheaval in Kenya pits those who promote capitalist
enterprise against those who reassert a subsistence political economy in concert with others
worldwide engaged in popular 'globalization from below.' In Part One, we draw distinctions between
two types of land redistribution programs and introduce seven types of land occupations which are
differentiated from one another according to the relations between the land occupiers and the land
owners. We then define the concepts we use to analyze the land occupation movement:
commodification, subsistence, the male deal, gendered class alliances and the fight for fertility. In Part Two, we document ten cases of land occupation by land poor peasants and squatters. We
assess the extent to which subsistence is furthered in the course of the occupations by considering the
gendered class politics of two organizations involved in the occupations: Mungiki (Congress, literally,
in Gikuyu, "we are the public")(4) and Muungano wa Wanavijiji (Organization of Villagers)(5). These
organizations embody the resurgence of Mau Mau. In the face of land privatization programmes
sponsored by the World Bank, which tend to increase instead of alleviate landlessness, the urban-based Muungano wa Wanavijiji (Organization of Villagers) and the massive Mungiki (Congress) have
arisen to address, among many other realities, the immediate needs of the impoverished for land. Muungano wa Wanavijiji (Organization of Villagers) is an organization with approximately 10,000
members, all of whom are land-poor slumdwellers, or 'urban villagers.' The self-organized
congregation is distinctive for its multi-ethnic membership, women's prominence and militant non-violent direct action tactics in defense of urban villagers and market retailers' land rights. Muungano
members trace their political roots back to Mau Mau. They trace their current landlessness to
Kenyatta's betrayal of the Mau Mau objective of "land for all." Muungano women assert that in the
guerilla war against British land alienation, "women never surrendered" (First Woman, wa Thungu,
29 May 1996). Mungiki (Congress) is a multi-class, mass organization that claims 4.5 million members. These are
drawn from a cross-section of society, and include dispossessed hawkers as well as members of the
Kenyan Parliament and armed forces. Mungiki members pay monthly dues of ten Kenya shillings
[about 15 US cents] and have made significant progress towards establishing workers' control over
labour processes and resources, including public transport. Mungiki's strength amongst hawkers and
small retailers protects the subsistence political economy. We assess these two organizations'
capacities to re-assert and 're-invent the commons' by considering their stands on female education
and female genital mutilation. We conclude this study of land occupation by assessing the gains and losses experienced by the
parties to the conflict over entitlements to land. We locate the Kenyan land occupations within the
movement of globalization from below which is coalescing in international resistance to corporate
rule. Land privatization verus redistribution The World Bank and popular social movements advocate conflicting types of land redistribution.
Both the privatizers and the redistributors claim that their type of 'land reform' will solve the
problems of hunger, poverty and landlessness. In 'popular redistributive land reform,' land is re-allocated to all for the primary purpose of supporting life. In contrast, 'World Bank sponsored
corporate land privatization,' seeks the commodification of land and its sale to individual capitalist
farmers who have 'purchasing power' and seek to expand commercial exploitation. The World Bank 'land reforms' enclose and release land to the market, thereby making it inaccessible
to the poor. Judith Achieng's critique of World Bank 'land reforms' in Kenya (9 December 2000)
cites the alternatives posited by the global movement of landless people. In 2000, the international
peasant movement, La Via Campesina, and the FoodFirst Information Action Network (FIAN)(6)
initiated a global campaign for agrarian reform: The campaign was initiated in recognition of the human right to food, recognised under article 11 of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which stipulates that landless peasants and
agricultural workers must gain access to those resources, mainly land, with which they can produce food.
Under this article, land reform is spelled out as one of the most important means of realising the right to food
(Achieng' 9 December 2000). Kenya's land occupation movement carries on the popular redistributive land reforms that were begun
by the Mau Mau, forestalled by Kenyatta's Independence deal of 'willing seller, willing buyer' and
taken up again by the children and grandchildren of Mau Mau in the contemporary resurgence. Table
1 below contrasts the distinctive characteristics of World Bank corporate 'land privatization' with
the social movements' redistribution of 'land for all.' Table #1: Difference between World Bank corporate 'land reform' and popular redistributive land reform Sources: First Woman 2001, based on Rosset, Peter, "Tides shift on agrarian reform: New movements show the way," Third World
Resurgence, No. 129/130, May/June, 2001, pp. 43-48. Types of Land Occupation Mau Mau was made a fighting force in the 1950s by peasants who were evicted from land and denied
"access to compensatory land" (Youe 2001:190). Evictions and new enclosures occurred again
between 1986 and 2002. It is within a context of forced eviction, increasing inequality in the
distribution of resources and the growing negative impact of World Trade Organization corporate
rule policies on the majority of people in Kenya that widespread land re-appropriations take on the
character of a 'Mau Mau resurgence.' This study examines the gendered social anatomy of a renewed
popular uprising. The land occupations which are prominent in the resurgence of struggle include the
following seven types,(7) which reflect different relationships of power between the 'owner' of the land
and those who assert entitlements to it: I. British legal claims (occupiers with title deeds) (1) reassertions of subsistence production on peasants' own land, especially after the failure of
commodity production (peasants destroy export crops and plant food, such as in Maragua). (2) defense of peasants' own land from incursion and attack by state-sponsored land grabs and
clearances (Githima, Molo). II. Customary claims (3) assertion of occupational entitlements by communities dwelling within state-owned forests; (4) assertion of ownership entitlements by labourers or community members to other state-owned
land and experimental agricultural stations (Agricultural Development Corporation farms); (5) outright re-appropriation, by resident labourers, of land owned by transnational corporations or
private individuals (plantations, agribusinesses, large farms, ranches and estates such as Basil
Criticos'); and III. Moral claims (6) assertion of ownership and control over the management of resources by tenants on state-operated settlement schemes (Mwea Irrigation Scheme); (7) occupation and defense of urban market sites and 'slum' residence areas by traders and residents
(Muruoto, Westlands, Soweto, Kamae); Against the encroachment by land grabbers and agents of export-oriented trade (such as private
sector agricultural extension workers) claimants in all seven relationships are defending and
reasserting their rights to land and resources for their own collective survival. The Fight for Fertility Our framework for understanding the struggle for land identifies three parties to a 'fight for fertility:'
1) women and men, united against class antagonists; 2) local men who 'sell out' to foreign capitalists;
and 3) foreign capitalists who profit from the exploitation of land and labour. We define 'fertility'
broadly, as the capacity to produce - to produce children, to produce food and other crops and to
produce cultural expressions and social networks. The fight for fertility in Kenya is a fight centred
around the control of land and women's agricultural labour. 'Control' over land and labour may
constitute part of the social organization of 'commodified' political economies or of 'subsistence'
political economies. Commodification is the complex of social processes through which all aspects of life's continuation,
including production, exchange, consumption and the preservation of the natural world, which had
previously taken place in communal subsistence-focused social arrangements, are restructured and
given market value. Capitalists operating nationally and internationally directly contribute to the
destruction of the subsistence realm as they construct commodified social relations. In the
commodified political economy, life sustaining activities are supplanted by profiteering and
speculation - the turning of money demand into more money demand (McMurtry 1999, 2002).
Commodification is central to capitalist industrialization. It is inherently global and enforces an
extreme division of labour. It also structures and inflames divisions amongst labourers, for instance
through constructing difference as divisive. Bennholdt-Thompson and Mies (1999:20-21) note that
within the commodified political economy, life is, so to speak, only a coincidental side-effect. It is typical of the capitalist industrial system that it declares
everything that it wants to exploit free of charge to be part of nature, a natural resource. To this belongs the
housework of women as well as the work of peasants in the Third World, but also the productivity of all of
nature. A commodified political economy is wholly and parasitically reliant on the subsistence political
economy. Capitalism cannot exist without the exploitation of the free subsistence labour of
housewives, peasants and indigenous people worldwide, who 'produce' people, food supplies and
'nature' and 'consume' the products of the capitalist market. Capital needs labour. But labour does
not need capital. In this sense, labour is autonomous from capital (Dyer-Witheford 1999). We characterize the subsistence political economy as autonomous from capital and the commodified
political economy, or containing the potential for autonomy. The subsistence political economies
which exist today in the interstices of capital's rule, have in fact survived decades, and in many cases,
centuries of attack and parasitism by the capitalist political economy. As we see it, the subsistence
political economy is historically a life economy. It is focused on the production of life. It is the source
of the culture of connectedness and community against the culture of capitalism which deifies
possessive individualism and competition. Subsistence at its fullest includes not only food production
for local consumption and regional trade, but a host of activities and sets of social networks whose
main aim is to support and enhance human existence. Subsistence production, or what we
alternatively refer to as the subsistence political economy, "includes all work that is expended in the
creation, re-creation and maintenance of immediate life and which has no other purpose" (Bennholdt-Thompson and Mies, 1999:20). Parties to the fight for fertility struggle to create, maintain and defend either subsistence or
commodification, depending on their class affiliations and aspirations. Capitalists commodify. Those
dispossessed and exploited by capital, in contrast, can be divided into two groups: one which pursues
the defense, maintenance and elaboration of subsistence and one which 'buys into' the capitalist deal
by involving themselves in capitalist production and disciplining the labour of others, especially the
unwaged labour of women, children, indigenous people and peasants. These three positions - 1)
exploited people's subsistence, 2) exploited people's compromise with capital and 3) capitalists'
commodification - succinctly characterize the three standpoints in the fight for fertility that is
expressed in the ten cases of land occupation reviewed in this study. We now consider in more detail the three parties to the fight for fertility. First, women have a special
stake in exercising control over their own fertility. They often act to maintain or regain control over
their own fertility (labour, land, children, food) against the dictates of their husbands and fathers,
against the state and its laws and against the plans and policies of the World Bank, International
Monetary Fund and corporate rule regime. Hence, when women rise up, they directly challenge
international capital. The first party to the fight for fertility, then, embraces women producers - in Kenya, mainly land poor
farmers and small traders - who struggle to regain or maintain control over their own labour, access
to land of their own and the elaboration of subsistence systems which support life (as opposed to
capitalists' profits). Men (husbands, young men) who have broken with their compromise with capital
often join women in what we call a 'gendered class alliance' to resist capitalist enclosure. The
gendered class alliance is formed through struggle when men abdicate their control over women's
labour and join women in seeking just and equitable redistribution of resources and power. The second party to the fight for fertility includes local Kenyan men - husbands, chiefs, policemen,
state officials, businessmen - who work on behalf of local and foreign capital to control 'fertility' for
profit making purposes. These might be Kenyan capitalists or exploited Kenyans who compromise
with capital, in what we call a 'male deal' (Dauda 1994, Turner and Oshare 1994). Male dealers
typically negotiate relationships which benefit capital and themselves at the expense of the
exploitation of women, most dispossessed men and the environment.(8) Examples of male deals include
the contracting of male heads of households to grow coffee, tea and other export crops for delivery
to transnational corporations.(9) Corporations and their stockholders reap most of the profit from the
trade of such crops. While small land holding men in these deals may make minor earnings, women
who actually produce the crops lose out on income and land for food and many other dimensions of
control over fertility and life. Landless men have fewer opportunities to gain access to land as land
becomes highly commodified. The environment is ravaged by the use of chemicals in the production
process. Chiefs, police, businessmen and state officials all take part in the coffee and tea male deals
in Kenya. When first the wives, and then most husbands broke this male deal in Maragua (detailed
in Part Two), the entire chain of male dealers involved in the industry faced a loss of profits, including
the foreign participants in the deal, such as coffee capitalists, investors, the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund. This brings us to the third party to the fight for fertility, that is, foreign capitalists and agents of
capitalist development. Capitalists in banks, agriculture and industry are the critical international
partners in the male deals. These international partners have taken up where colonialists left off in
1963, in that they use male deals to continue neo-colonial 'indirect rule.' International capitalists
promote accumulation and sanction its violent enforcement in ex-colonies. United States business
economics professor, Ronald Seavoy, wrote in 2000 that "Contrary to what most scholars teach,
investments in armed forces are one of the most productive investments that governments of peasant
nations can make. ... all police and soldiers ... must be prepared to enforce commercial policies on
peasants with the maximum amount of violence if necessary (Seavoy 2000:113, emphasis added).
In order to establish, extend and maintain capitalist production, international capitalists and national
governments engage local men in male deals to discipline especially women's labour into production
for international markets and the benefit of foreign profit-makers. Historically, colonialists and African male dealers buried or erased previous social rights and customs
which gave women considerable power over land and their own sexualities. Wealthy African men and
chiefs who testified before to the Native Land Tenure commission in 1929, for instance, kept secret
certain Kikuyu customs such as the right of women to become 'female husbands.' Widows married
other women in order to maintain ownership of their dead husband's land. The 'wife' was encouraged
to bear children, who inherited through the female husband and 'father.' One writer of the 1929
report noted that colonialists had difficulty in obtaining information about women's land rights,
"probably because it is a relic of mother-right which is a custom fast disappearing and which the
natives no longer wish to admit as custom" (Kenya 1929:26 cited in MacKenzie 1990: 69). Another
custom which reveals women's wider spectrum of choices and powers in the pre-colonial period is
that of mwendia ruhui. In this practice a widow took a male lover who was usually landless to
provide labour in exchange for food and to father children to inherit the dead husband's land.
Commenting on informants' reluctance to speak about the practice of mwendia ruhui, the 1929 report
noted that "it is a practice which they wish to discontinue as soon as possible because it is a relic of
matrilineal and matrilocal customs which have fallen into desuetude" (Kenya 1929:72 cited in
MacKenzie 1990: 69). The male deal in the 1929 Land Commission hearings involved British-appointed chiefs dismissing
land distribution practices which were positive for both women and landless men. These male dealing
chiefs reduced the numbers of people within their own communities who had legitimate customary
claim to land. The chiefs in effect allowed the colonialists to alienate Africans' land and to fix
boundaries around 'reserve' land that Africans' were allowed to occupy. In exchange, the chiefs
accorded to themselves greater control over the allocation of land within these 'reserves' by burying
women's and landless men's land rights during a time that was marked by an often violent transition
from communal to individual land ownership, especially in the Kikuyu reserves. Colonialists obtained
the chiefs' tacit agreement to continuous European theft of land. By the early 1940s, landless women
and men were organized to resist their dispossession by chiefs and European colonialists who faced
the wrath of the armed Mau Mau uprising of 1952. In summary, the fight for fertility is a conceptual tool which may be used to map out the social
relations amongst the gendered and ethnicized class antagonists involved in the processes of
commodification and resistance to it. Capitalists employ 'male deals' to accommodate men from the
exploited class within a hierarchy of exploitation and profit extraction central to the process of
commodification. Male dealers act as buffers between the exploited and capitalists, and as channels,
passing the goods and services of the exploited up to capitalists. Dispossessed women, who shoulder
the brunt of exploitation by producing both labour power and other commodities, are often first to
resist (Turner and Benjamin 1995). In their resistance, dispossessed women break with men who are
entangled in the male deal. These women sometimes gain the support of men who themselves break
with the male deal and join women in gendered class alliances. We now turn to the specific character
of the fight for fertility in ten cases of land occupation between 1986 and 2002. Part Two: Land Occupations and the Fight For Fertility In this part of the study, we examine ten land occupations which together illustrate many facets of
the fight for fertility in Kenya in the new millennium. These cases are exemplary instances of the seven
types of land occupation listed in Part One. Peasants' and squatters' defense of the land they occupy
follows upon attempts by others to control the land or evict the occupants. We include four cases of
the occupation and defense of urban market sites and slum villages, as this is the one type embracing
the reality of city life. We examine six other cases which represent the other six types of land
occupation. Each of these six cases takes place in a rural area. These rural cases involve peasants'
defense and reassertion of subsistence on their own land and squatters' occupation of forests,
experimental agricultural stations, private land and settlement schemes. The 1990s land grab politics
motivate dispossessed peoples' occupation and defense of land to which they have legal, customary
and moral claims. Each of the ten cases is described by text and by a chart which assesses the gains
and losses experienced by the three parties to the fight for fertility: women and men united in
gendered class alliances; local Kenyan male dealers and foreign capitalists. This part of the study
examines the social anatomy of the land occupations in terms of the changes in gendered class
relations which characterize each. 1. Maragua: peasants reassert subsistence on their own land In Maragua, in central Kenya, small land owning peasants have grown coffee for three decades.
Though they own their own land, they are prevented by law from uprooting coffee trees. The milling
and marketing of peasants' coffee crops fell completely into the hands of undemocratic cooperative
society officials, state marketing board managers and agents of multinational food and beverage
corporations which purchased the beans. Farmers had no say in the price of their crop and were
subjected to the vagaries of the global market and currency fluctuations. They were also subjected
to a host of price and import policies imposed by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund,
including the privatization of agricultural extension services. Such policies increase private investors'
profits by directly impoverishing coffee farmers. Since 1985, women small coffee farmers in Maragua (two to ten acre farms) have torn out coffee
trees and replaced them with bananas and other vegetables. After a decade of falling prices, many of
their husbands had expanded their coffee plots into women's food plots in an effort to recoup income.
Women in Maragua challenged their husbands, the state and the World Bank, which pushes export
production because government revenue from exports is channeled directly into debt repayment and
petroleum imports. The transformation in Maragua involved an integrated build up of social networks
with other women farmers, with transporters and with market traders. Many local youth and most
women's husbands joined in replacing coffee with bananas and other locally tradeable crops. Maragua
women took control over their labour, the crops that they produced and their family land. They began
to rebuild a subsistence political economy which supported their own family's welfare and the welfare
of land poor women and men. All were engaged in local and regional transport as well as in wholesale
and retail produce trade (Turner et al, 1997; Turner and Brownhill 2001). 2. Mwea: tenants assert control over state-operated settlement scheme Mwea is a state-run rice irrigation scheme. The colonial government developed irrigation at Mwea
detention camp in 1953 using captive labour "of the Mau Mau detainees made available after the
declaration of state of emergency in October 1952 and the ensuing Mau Mau war" (Njihia 1984:1).
Because they were left landless after the war, many of the detainees had no alternative to remaining
in the detention camp. In 1961, the emergency was over and the state recast the Mwea detention
camp as the Mwea Irrigation Scheme. Residents are classified as 'tenants.' The National Irrigation
Board sells milling and marketing services and inputs to the farmers. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, tenants of the Mwea irrigation scheme mounted a struggle to force
the government to issue title deeds to the residents, many of whom had lived in the scheme for over
thirty years (Turner et al. 1997). Single and divorced women had already begun to cultivate land on
the edges of the scheme, and to divert water, land and inputs in the scheme to the cultivation of
tomatoes. Some young men and women in Mwea were also involved in the trade of rice on the
parallel market, to avoid channeling the produce through the monopoly National Irrigation Board
(NIB) marketing mechanism, which subtracted production costs from farmers' pay packets. Many wives in Mwea struggled with their husbands over control over land and labour. Women's
efforts to control their own labour and to use some of the inputs at the scheme to grow subsistence
crops contravened not only the husbands' authority, but the government's directives on the
production of maximum rice yields. According to a 1984 study in Mwea, the farmers who delivered
the highest yields of rice to the National Irrigation Board, were men "aged between 36 and 40 years,
had previously been traders and had three wives" (Njihia, 1984:7). Such men were classified in the
report as "good farmers" who could control large amounts of family labour producing rice, and
prevent the diversion of inputs to wives' production of tomatoes and other vegetables. The report
characterized farmers as "bad farmers" those men who had some or all of the following
characteristics: 1. Misdirected motivation or lack of it. Some farmers preferred salaried employment. They would,
therefore, leave their holdings temporarily unattended for short periods while engaging in such
activities. 2. Poor motivation. Lazy. They do not follow instructions. 3. Social weaknesses. a) No proper family, mainly bachelors (young or old). Lack reliable labour and
proper control of inputs and output. b) Unstable families. Farmer is swindled by wives or sons. c) Old
and physically weak. Lack strength and managerial capacity. d) Physically and mentally sick. 4. Unfaithful to scheme management. They sell some of their produce in the black market. They
might sell some of their inputs also (Njihia, 1984, p. 7). Those men who "leave their holdings unattended," in reality leave their wives unattended. The women
then irrigate their vegetables with water from rice paddies. Men who do not "control" their
womenfolk, find that they divert their energies into vegetable production. Without question violence
is often a method of control (Stamp 1989:66). The government encouraged this violence by
rewarding "good farmers" who disciplined their wives' labour most effectively. In the mid-1980s
battered women frequently fled from their husbands who consequently became "bad farmers" with
"no proper family." By 1998, women faced such violence at the hands of Mwea men, and poverty in
the face of exploitation by the National Irrigation Board, that most young women refused to marry
(Mwea men 23 July 1998). Finally, late in 1998, Mwea women and men together staged an uprising and took control of the
scheme. Many women and young men had established illicit rice and vegetable production and trade,
and used the newly constructed subsistence system as a basis for the solidarity necessary to take over
the scheme altogether. While many Mwea residents stopped growing rice and plant tomatoes instead,
others divert their rice to the parallel, or producer-controlled, market. Still others have tried to sell
their rice to the National Irrigation Board. This state Board, however, can no longer on-sell all of the
Mwea rice, even at the reduced rate of production after the farmers' takeover of the scheme. The
near-monopoly that Mwea farmers had had on the commercial domestic rice trade(10) was broken in
the late 1990s when corporations took advantage of World Bank 'trade liberalization' policies and
flooded the Kenyan market with cheaper, dumped rice from Asia. In addition, the government has
the Mwea Rice Mill slated for privatization, and is inviting international corporations to invest in
commercial rice production. Investors encourage the return of the "good," albeit violent, husband.
They introduce genetically modified rice for export and experiment with new seed propagation
methods. The parallel markets which have developed in Mwea over the last decade provide a means through
which women land occupiers advance their control over their own labour, both within and outside
of marriage. Gendered class alliances strengthen young Mwea men's access to land. These alliances
have challenged all the rules of the scheme, including the disinheritance of sons. As farmers
increasingly control their own production, they further expand their social networks to facilitate
exchange through relations with secure public transporters and reliable market retailers.
Environmental realities facing residents include polluted ground water and deforestation. The
diversification of crop production in Mwea increases the soil's fertility. Planting of fruit and nut trees
promotes the reclamation of the physical environment and self-provisioning. Four Muungano wa Wanavijiji (Organization of Villagers) land occupations In Kenya, the poor have no security where they live. In Nairobi, at least 65 percent of over three million
people live in the slums, making most of them de facto squatters. The little rooms they rent or the shacks they
have put up can be demolished any time, day or night, with everything they own either destroyed or stolen.
The poor are considered "illegal" in their own country, that is, without rights, because they do not have a title
deed. How can one expect peace and development in large African cities like Nairobi where hundreds of
thousands of squatters live in daily fear, insecurity and uncertainty? (Land Caucus October 1999) Nairobi, the capital of Kenya, has a population of close to four million. Approximately 55 percent of these
inhabitants are forced to live in one of the 100 slums spread throughout the city. In these areas the state does
not provide any physical or social services including water, sanitation, roads, electricity, health care centers
or schools. The poor live in small, overcrowded shacks made of rusting tin and mud. More shocking than the
squalid conditions in which they live is the fact that they are crammed onto less than 1.5 percent of the land
in Nairobi, and yet that land is not their own (Maryknoll August 2000). According to the Mau Mau struggle, everybody was to own land, some piece of land to occupy. Now you can
find some government officials with something to do with 100 plots in one city. And thousands of people have
nowhere to call home. Now our future plan is to struggle with them until they agree that the land in Nairobi
is ours, all, including them. So Muungano will not sleep, will fight, struggle for this land (First Woman,
Livingstone Gichamo, 25 July 1998). We the Muungano wa Wanavijiji [Organization of Villagers] want this: after we teach the people how to fight
for their rights, and after repossessing our villages, we want everybody, meaning the poor people, to have
better living conditions and development in that village. ... Like having good schools, and everything good
so that our children could also develop and also [have] good health. Because the situation we are in now is
awful. And that is why the grabbers get the chance to come and destroy our houses and grab the village.
Because when they burn our houses, they just burn easily. But when we build permanent houses, they can't
burn easily (First Woman, Sabina Wanjiku 25 July 1998). 3. Muruoto: occupation and defense of urban market and residential site The 3,000 residents and traders in the urban slum village of Muruoto were traders and suppliers of
cooked food to the urban work force. A majority of those who prepare and sell processed food on
the Nairobi streets and in small markets are women. They, on average, earn more than men in the
prepared food trade (Spring 2000:333). Food retailers earn a decent living and link rural subsistence
farmers to the urban food markets. On 25 May 1990, officers of the Nairobi City Council, in an effort
to 'clean up' the city, attempted to demolish Muruoto. Police were called in but residents fought them
off with stones. There ensued a three day, pitched battle between the police and the residents of
Muruoto. Finally, the police and demolition crews retreated and the Muruoto people remained to
occupy the land and defend their homes. A massive, well-organized general strike, with rallies and
demonstrations, took place six weeks later, from 7 to 10 July 1990, spurred in part by the popular
outcry against the attack on Muruoto. The strike was enforced by youth who stopped all transport
into and out of Nairobi. They lit bonfires and put up barricades across major roads, and dropped
stones onto passing transporters who defied the 'general strike' call. Soon, no drivers dared to be on
the road. The occupants of Muruoto, some of whom were elderly Mau Mau women, were finally evicted in an
unannounced raid in October 1990. Several people were killed when the demolition crews flattened
homes while their owners slept inside. In the fight that broke out, at least one City Council guard was
killed. The city offered no alternative location for the residents of Muruoto. A senior operative in the
Nairobi City Council was widely believed to have been behind the demolition. It is rumoured that he
illicitly acquired the title deed for the Muruoto land. After the final clearance in October 1990, the
Muruoto land was allegedly sold by the operative for a hugely inflated price to the cooperative society
of the City Council workers. After the purchase of the land, the corrupt cooperative society officials
allocated further monies from the City Council workers' pension fund to build an office block on the
Muruoto land (First Woman, 17 November 2001). 4. Westlands: occupation and defense of urban market site In 1992 a Nairobi businessman claimed ownership of Westlands market, the site of small kiosks run
by several hundred retailers from the slums. Small retailers of cooked food and fresh produce
supported their children with the money they earned in this well-situated market. Its choice location
gave slum dwellers access to the high-end market at Westlands, where Europeans, Asians and
wealthy Africans shopped. Many of the kiosks and stalls in Westlands were owned by men, who ran
businesses ranging from shoe and electronics repairs to retail sales of produce and used clothing. The small traders' kiosks are located outside of a shopping centre owned and operated mainly by
Asian businesses. The Asians' shops in Westlands stock many items which are imported from
companies from abroad, such as Outspan and Ceres orchards in South Africa. Prices are higher in the
shops than in the kiosks outside, with the result that many customers prefer to purchase produce in
the kiosks. Transnational corporations must compete with these Kenyan 'informal sector' traders,
including those dealing in subsistence goods, 'appropriated' items (such as cast off flowers from
flower plantations) and the parallel market rice. Many store owners advocated the removal of the
kiosks.(11)
The small traders defended their rights to occupy the market and the case went to court. The
court heard the case for six years, and finally decided against the small retailers and in favour of the
businessman. Immediately thereafter, in April 1998, a demolition crew arrived at Westland market
and flattened it, without notice and without allowing retailers to retrieve their merchandise. Members
of the Organization of Villagers protested the demolition. Police arrested ten. In solidarity, 65 other
Organization of Villagers members demanded to be taken into custody as well. Forty of the arrested
were women. The 75 protestors were remanded for one week and upon their release, they rebuilt
Westlands market (First Woman 25 July 1998). 5. Soweto: occupation and defense of urban residential site The Soweto slum community within Nairobi shares more than a name with the Soweto township in
Johannesburg, South Africa. The two Sowetos have more in common than extreme poverty, poor
living conditions and state harassment. Residents share a militancy characterized by students' massive
uprising against the apartheid regime in South Africa's Soweto in 1976 and by residents' determined
resistance to landgrabbers and demolition crews in Kenya's Soweto in 1996. In December 1996, occupants of the Soweto slum village were attacked, and their homes burned by
thugs suspected to have been hired by a businessman who claimed ownership of the land. A few days
later, one of the 100 men mobilized to finish the demolition of Soweto was cornered by the residents.
They beat him unconscious. Television cameras captured a woman and several men pouring kerosene
on his body and burning him to death. Jane Wairimu Mwangi was arrested for pouring kerosene on
him from her lamp before a man threw a match onto his body. Many other women and men were
arrested and detained without charge in January 1997. (Those arrested included Marion Wairimu and
her four month old baby, who was ill at the time) Residents then rebuilt their tin and timber houses,
only to see them destroyed again a week later. "Armed police sealed off the Soweto slum village,
Nairobi, as hired men pulled down the structures built on a plot reportedly owned by a city tycoon.
... Attempts by the villagers to resist eviction failed because of the police presence" (Nation
Correspondent, 31 December 1996:3). After living on the land for more then 23 years, Soweto
residents were forcibly removed (Nation Correspondent, 21 December 1996:5). One woman occupant whose home was destroyed stated that "'We are ready to die here unless we
are compensated and given an alternative plot by the person behind the constant evictions from this
land!' ... A now homeless mother said villagers feared moving to an alternative site that had been
pointed out to them at Kayole as it too belonged to an individual. 'I have nowhere to go to because
the new site belongs to somebody else who will definitely evict us,' she said" (Nation Correspondent,
31 December 1996:3).(12) Women members of the lobby group Release Political Prisoners (RPP) helped organize protests
against the mass arrests of Soweto people in January 1997. Release Political Prisoners' members
mobilized with the Organization of Villagers, Mungiki (Congress) and Soweto residents to
demonstrate against the police over the arrests. A white South African man was among the
demonstrators. He was questioned by police, who also confiscated his passport and threatened to
arrest him. The demonstrators insisted they would not vacate the police station without him. Police
released him. The Daily Nation reported that "Mr. Wegerif, an opponent of the now defunct
apartheid system, ... said he was told he had no right to intervene on behalf of the villagers since he
is a tourist. 'I'm not a tourist. I am a human rights activist,' he said, likening the Soweto situation to
the apartheid system in South Africa" (Konchora 14 January 1997:4). 6. Kamae: occupation and defense of urban residential site In May 1998, a chief claimed ownership of a plot of land in Kamae village, 10 kilometers outside
Nairobi. Kamae is home to a community made up of small scale subsistence farmers and casual
labourers on nearby coffee estates. Most households are female headed. Residents claim that the land,
part of a farm owned by Jomo Kenyatta, was given to them by the late president. On May 5, 1998,
a chief moved in with dozens of armed guards to occupy a portion of the village land. He claimed he
was going to build a home for street children. Kamae villager, Salome Wacera Wainaina (44 years),
confronted the chief and called to her neighbours to help. The villagers came to resist the chief's
occupation of the land. Police shot into the crowd, killing Wainaina and injuring a young man.
Caroline Atieno, a secretary of Organization of Villagers, stated that In Muungano, I can say that the women are in the front line. ... for example, in Kamae village, where a
woman was in the front line protesting about the land grabbing. We Muungano and the Release Political
Prisoners [lobby group] did a demonstration and left the coffin at the Provincial Commissioner's office. So
the women were the people who are very active in protesting (First Woman, Caroline Atieno 25 July 1998). The protestors demanded the arrest of the chief and the policeman who murdered Wainaina. The
policeman was merely transferred to another division. 7. State-owned forests: forest dwellers' assertion of occupational entitlements Dozens of rural squatter families have been residing by the roadside around Mt. Kenya after the
government evicted them from Mt Kenya and Aberdare forests in 1989. They are among the
thousands of squatters that the government claims will be settled on 170,000 acres of land to be
excised from state forests in Central and Rift Valley Provinces. The excision plans have set in motion
a conflict amongst the government, squatters, donors and environmentalists (Kago and Munene 20
November 2001). Wangari Maathai and environmental activists in the Green Belt movement and in other civic
organizations oppose the privatization of the forest land. They claim the forests are not only being
allocated to forest dwellers, who survive especially on bee-keeping and the collection of wild honey.
Genuine forest dwellers are hunters and gatherers who are very capable of preserving and nurturing
the forest and its many resources, including water catchment areas. However, the environmentalists
claim that much of the land has already been allocated to private developers who will destroy the
ecosystem (Kago and Munene 20 November 2001). Joseph Sergon, lawyer for the Ogieks of Mau
West, "differs with Green Belt Movement co-ordinator Wangari Maathai's blanket condemnation of
the degazettement notice. 'It is ironic that Professor Maathai could condemn an action that was for
their [the Ogiek's] benefit while all along she has been supporting their cause'" (Riunge 21 November
2001). At the same time, the Ogieks of Mau East plan to sue the government over the planned
excision of more than 35,000 hectares of their forest, due to the allocation of plots in the forest to
"some outsiders" (Riunge 21 November 2001). It is important to distinguish between the forest
dwellers' use and preservation of the forest and the private developers' exploitation and destruction
of forests. The government claims that it is responding to the needs of the landless by allocating forest land to
them. But evidence of corruption in the allocation of land to big businessmen has raised serious
concerns about who is making the decisions, and how the allocations are being made. As of December 2001, the forest dwellers were excluded from decision making, while politicians and
big businessmen advanced their own interests in the forest privatization exercise. For example, in
October 2001, a Cabinet Minister "hived off" 1,000 acres of clan land from the Kaptagat Forest,
without the blessings of elders of the community. In protest, residents pulled down the fence he had
erected, and nine of them were charged. When a local chief asked elders to curse the nine, the elders
refused. Instead they asked the chief to call the Minister before their council within two weeks to
explain to them why he had alienated land without their permission (Ngure 8 November 2001).
Because the Minister is making decisions the forest excisions will lead to the commodification of the
forest, and therefore to the exclusion of subsistence users and the eventual destruction of the
ecosystem. 8. Agricultural Development Corporation (ADC) farm: assertion of ownership by community
members Another area of major concern is in the allocation of public agricultural land. For instance, landless people
are known to have worked for their entire lifetimes on Agricultural Development Corporation (ADC) farms
in the Rift Valley for a pittance. Yet the wheeler dealing landed aristocracy use their political and financial
might to get huge chunks of such land whenever it is allocated at the expense of the poor. At the peak of the
rampant land grabbing, some shameless fellows were going for land used for vital purposes such as
agricultural research, army barracks and national parks! (Sisule 8 October 2001) In early 2000, Marakwet squatters occupied a 14,500-acre Agricultural Development Corporation
(ADC) farm in Cherangany, Rift Valley Province. They claimed that the land was a white settlers'
estate during the colonial period and was made into an experimental agricultural station after
independence. President Jomo Kenyatta had given the land to the Marakwet people. In early 2000,
however, some 500 Marakwet were evicted from the farm by armed General Service Unit soldiers.
A section of the farm had been allocated to a senior government official. In May 2000, the Daily
Nation reported that armed Marakwet youths barred a surveyor and a chief from entering the ADC farm. The youths, who carried
arrows, swords and machetes, confronted the deputy district surveyor, Mr Naphtali Kinoti, and Kaplamai
chief Michael Arusei, who fled. The 400 youths surrounded the officer's vehicle and pushed it off the road,
saying the two had been sent to parcel out the land to top government officials. ... The Parliamentary
Anti-Corruption Committee has named prominent personalities said to have been allocated land on the farm,
formerly known as Duke of Manchester (Nation 21 May 2000). 9. Criticos' farm: re-appropriation of private land by resident labourers Basil Criticos, a Greek-born Kenyan Member of Parliament, owns at least 72,000 acres of land in
Eastern Kenya. Some 47,000 acres of this land are in Taveta. The other 25,000 acres are in the Jipe
area. In early 2000, Member of Parliament Stephen Ndicho called on squatters in Kenya to follow
the example of those in Zimbabwe who had invaded white owned land. Squatters had long been
occupying Criticos' land. When several thousand acres of Criticos' sisal crop were burned in April
2000, Criticos accused Ndicho of inciting squatters to invade his farm. The President fired Criticos
from his ministerial post and charged him with incitement when Criticos publicly protested that
another 8,000 acres of his Taveta farm had been occupied by squatters. The squatters accused
Criticos of setting fire to Lutimae Nursery School and 18 other houses in a fit of anger (Nation 21
May 2000). Squatters organized into the Taveta Welfare Society. They claim that the tracts of land in question
were taken from the indigenous people by force during the colonial era and that the sale of the land
to Criticos' father was later sanctioned by President Jomo Kenyatta's government. The Daily Nation
reported that workers on the sisal plantation blamed Criticos for the tension on the farm, "noting that
they had all been allowed by him to farm on the plantation as a reward for electing him the local MP.
Said Mr Mwala Kizembe, who has lived on the farm since 1952: 'It was Criticos himself who told
us we are free to farm for subsistence because we had elected him. But we were surprised when he
turned around and accused us of being invaders.' He challenged Mr Criticos to pick out people he
claimed had come from as far afield as Kitui to his farm" (Kwena 16 May 2001). Criticos had used his land as collateral for huge loans and could not pay his debts. The bank has taken
possession and seeks to force a sale. The squatters occupying the land are resisting the sale.
Consequently, the bank's "property rights" are unenforceable. The Kenya government appears
ineffective in securing private property. The conflicting assertions of ownership and entitlement to
Criticos' land has negative repercussions for all commercial farmers and their financiers in Kenya. The squatters have protested the sale of Criticos' land. Ruth Lelewu, chairperson of the Taveta
Welfare Society, issued a statement in May 2001, vowing to block politician Harun Mwau's attempt
to buy vast tracts of the farm. "The Taveta community is not taking things lying down and very soon
Mr Mwau will regret not only buying the farm but having such a desire. This is a matter of life and
death. Depriving thousands of people of their birth-right is not something to play with," the statement
read (Mutonya 8 June 2001). 10. Githima: Peasant defense of land against clearances by means of state sponsored violence There is clear evidence that the government was involved in provoking this ethnic violence for political
purposes and has taken no adequate steps to prevent it from spiraling out of control. So far, we estimate that
the clashes have left at least 1,500 people dead and 300,000 displaced. (Human Rights Watch November
1993) The Kenyan government instigated the violence after being forced to concede to a multiparty system, in order
to punish and disenfranchise ethnic groups associated with the opposition, while rewarding its supporters with
illegally obtained land. ... the government has obstructed efforts to return the displaced to their homes. The
government is responsible for harassing the displaced and those who assist them, while allowing the
perpetrators of the violence to enjoy complete impunity (Human Rights Watch June 1997). One woman told me, one of the clash victims, I remember her verbatim words when she was testifying of her
experience, and said, well, she has been a Christian. But for a long time, she did not imagine miracles
happening. But she did see a miracle happen. And what was very significant was that Bishop Ndingi was not
praying in the normal way. Because when he arrived in Molo and saw what was happening, these were the
words of his prayer: "God! I am calling you to come to Molo now! Because whatever is at Molo, it is only you
that can handle it. Can you come now?" And that woman was saying, the warriors now were moving to the
Church, the sanctuary where the people had gone to take refuge. And they could see they were going to be
burnt. But the moment Ndingi prayed like that, they don't know what held up those warriors who were not
able to move. And the Molo people became wild and moved after them. And that is when many of the warriors
were killed and actually the Molo people accepted that they have to fight back and they started to organize
themselves (First Woman, 27 April 1997). Githima is a village near Kerisoi in Molo South in the Rift Valley. Before independence Githima was
a farm of about 1,300 acres owned by a white settler. After independence, the government purchased
the settler's farm. In the mid 1960s, about 300 families joined together in a land-buying cooperative
to buy the farm from the government. The cooperative's members subdivided the land into four acre
plots and negotiated a purchase arrangement allowing the new residents to pay off their shares over
time. On the evening of 22 April 1992, most of the village men stayed outside keeping watch, as nearby
villages had been attacked in the days before and leaflets had been spread around Githima warning
Kikuyu residents to vacate or face attack. The villagers could hear war cries renting the air from a
village about five kilometers away. The children could not sleep, but were told to stay inside. Many
women stayed in their kitchens, near the fires, with their kitchen knives on hand. By morning, more than 2,000 attackers reached Githima. Six or seven hundred women and men of
Githima's population of approximately 3,000 stayed to fight the attackers. The rest, including children
and pregnant women, were escorted by men through the forest to Kerisoi, the nearest town. Men
disguised themselves in women's clothes, since it was clear that though women and children were
being killed, men were especially targeted. The residents fought the attackers all day long. Helicopters landed nearby to resupply the attackers
with arrows. They killed many of the Githima people. By evening, the villagers retreated to the town
of Kerisoi. Among those killed that day were Mau Mau women and men who refused to retreat from
the attackers. Within two days, all of the buildings in Githima had been burnt to the ground, all of the
animals stolen or killed, and all of the property destroyed including fields of crops and the cooperative
society tractor. Between 1992 and 2002, most Githima residents returned to the village and rebuilt their homes. A
sense of insecurity remains, however, and some residents have sold their farms to Kalenjin buyers. Analysis of Land Occupations We turn now to a consideration of the social character of the land occupation movements examined
above. We assess the extent to which the land occupations indicate a struggle between
commodification on the one hand and the reassertion of subsistence on the other hand. We do so first
by considering the types of land occupations reviewed and comparing the outcomes of each. Second,
we assess the extent to which the three actors in the fight for fertility have made overall gains or
losses in the course of this 15 year struggle over land. Finally, we link the Kenyan struggle to the
global conflict between globalizers from above and globalizers from below. In Part One, we differentiated seven different types of land occupations according to the relationship
between the occupiers and the owners of the land. We can summarize by grouping the seven types
of occupations into three categories: occupants who have 1) British legal claim (ie. title deeds); 2)
customary claim or 3) moral claim to land. Those who have British legal claim to land have succeeded in maintaining their occupation of land
and their reassertion of subsistence. Under the category of 'British legal claim to land' falls
occupations involving peasant reassertions of subsistence on their own land, as in Maragua; and
peasant defense of their own land from incursion by state sponsored land grabs, such as in Githima.
We also include peasant defense of 'slum' communities by the people of Kamae, because residents
there were granted their land by Jomo Kenyatta, but never received a title deed. In each of these
cases, peasants have British legal entitlements to the land they occupy. Subsistence was already strong
before residents were forced to defend their right to the land they occupied. In each of these three
communities, residents successfully upheld their legal entitlements and defended their subsistence
livelihoods. In Maragua, subsistence was significantly elaborated through the replacement of coffee
production (supplied by foreign inputs, and channeled to global markets) with banana production
(supplied by local trade using indigenous knowledge, and channeled to local markets to feed local
workers). In Githima, the militance of the Mau Mau struggle, which had given residents the chance
to own land in the Rift Valley in the first place, was revived to defend this hard-won land. Githima
residents united and successfully thwarted the extra-judicial expropriation of their land. They
reestablished subsistence production. Continued insecurity has made trade difficult. Insecurity and
lack of trust between neighbours have led to a trickle of Githima residents selling their land and
leaving. This exodus open a channel through which Githima land is alienated to ruling party
supporters by judicial means, through sale of land on the market. Finally, in Kamae, residents uphold
their legal claim to land by citing the authority of Jomo Kenyatta who allocated part of his many
square miles of prime land to them. The loss of life in the defense of Kamae land strengthened the
social movements of Muungano wa Wanavijiji (Organization of Villagers) and Mungiki (Congress). Land occupiers citing customary claim have challenged the colonial era expropriation of their lands
and the neo-colonial reaffirmation of the British enclosures. The occupants who claim customary
rights hold fast to their entitlements and boldly defy 'land grabbers' who contravene indigenous
tenure procedures. In three cases, the state-owned forests of the Ogieks, the state-owned Agricultural
Development Corporation farmlands and the land 'owned' privately by Basil Criticos, occupiers
reassert their customary right to the land and seek to reestablish subsistence with the security of
recognized entitlements. Because the land is commercially valuable; occupants' customary claims
confront the market's construction of land as a commodity and as alienable collateral. However, due
to the continuing political saliency of customary social practices and rights, it is not easy for private
developers to extinguish customary tenure claims without raising the specter of international
campaigns in defense of the rights of indigenous people. At the time of writing (December 2001)
most occupiers who claim customary rights to land sustain their occupancies. Finally, land occupiers who assert moral claims to land, in the absence of legal or customary rights,
have secured only ambiguous gains. In Muruoto and Soweto, occupiers have been evicted from urban
market and residential sites. Despite losing their land, those evicted from Muruoto and Soweto have
shifted their locations and advanced subsistence on new ground. Further, they have retained the moral
high ground and have mobilized effectively into social movements such as Muungano wa Wanavijiji
(Organization of Villagers) and Mungiki (Congress), for the defense of land for all, especially the
poor. In Westlands, the market occupiers face constant pressure. Only in Mwea, the state-operated
rice scheme, have occupiers retained their longstanding hold on land. In Mwea, subsistence has
advanced in significant ways. Tenants have united in an attempt to establish legal rights to land over
which they have claimed moral ownership. Mwea women's insistence on growing and marketing
tomatoes feeds into a regional reassertion of subsistence. In terms of the fight for fertility, our analysis indicates a general strengthening of subsistence across
the range of land occupations detailed. As land occupiers succeed in asserting their entitlements, they
strengthen bonds with one another across religious, ethnic and gender lines and mount a growing
challenge to male dealers in their midst. Further, there is growing resistance against foreign capital,
as Kenya's dispossessed defend rights to land, labour and resources which have for so long been
exploited by foreign firms. Peasant women and men have advanced subsistence in Maragua, Mwea, Kamae and Githima. In each
of these cases, women have insisted on land for food production and men have joined them in
asserting this right. Subsistence livelihoods have in turn sustained the defense of land against attack.
In the course of defending their entitlements to land, women have cultivated their militancy against
anyone who attempts to bar them from access to subsistence resources. Women have been central
to stand-offs with police, raiders and demolition crews in Muruoto, Westlands, Soweto, Mwea,
Kamae and Githima. In some cases women have engaged in armed defense. In addition, those making
customary claims (forest dwellers and squatters on Agricultural Development Corporation farms and
on Criticos' land) have established or seek to reinvent subsistence livelihoods consistent with their
own survival and the elaboration of their cultural heritage. In all of these diverse land battles,
exploited women and men have formed gendered class alliances in defense of subsistence livelihoods
against the expropriation and exploitation inherent in commodified production and exchange systems. Male dealers in Kenya have been repeatedly identified, challenged, and delegitimized by the people
they dispossess. Husbands in Maragua and Mwea were challenged by their wives, and most of them
capitulated to the women's demands when they realized that the subsistence alternative proposed by
their wives was more lucrative and sustainable than the commodified economy into which they had
been tied for some decades. Police, paramilitary troops and demolition crews have used "ultimate
force" to implement commodified property relations in Mwea, Muruoto, Westlands, Soweto, Kamae,
Githima and on the Agricultural Development Corporation farmlands. But the forces of repression
were repelled in all cases. Though the police finally prevailed in Muruoto and Soweto, slumdwellers
and hawkers throughout the city of Nairobi have lost much of their fear of the police. The poor have
joined social movements to stand against state terror, and to delegitimize the 'Homeguard' work of
dispossessing the poor and defending wealthy land grabbers.(13) Foreign capital, including the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and transnational
corporations operating in Kenya have had their profits negatively impacted by the land occupation
movement. They have had to reorient their approach to commodification in Maragua. This
reorientation emphasizes French beans and genetically modified bananas as alternatives to coffee. In
Mwea, foreign investors fled. Where squatters make customary claims to land entitlements, the entire
system of private property is challenged. Foreign and locally based corporations face the possibility
of claims by indigenous people for customary entitlements to land 'owned' by big export-oriented
businesses. In fact, the more foreign capital advances the privatization project, the more desperate
become those who are dispossessed and the more likely it is that they will make claims on the land
of transnational corporations. More and more dispossessed people in Kenya, and worldwide
denounce land grabbers and dispossessors. The project of commodification, therefore, spawns
resistance. It spurs a profound integration of local and international movements for the resurgence
of producer control over resources, creativity, knowledge, time, trade and life itself. The ten instances of land occupation reviewed above reveal the existence of an expanding and
integrated series of dispossessed peoples' actions against commodified uses of land. The occupations
take on the character of 'globalization from below.' Many Kenyans have made international links with
other activists struggling for land rights and against corporate globalization. The internet and
international travel by activists have strengthened the campaign for land redistribution in Kenya in key
ways. Each occupation or instance of land defense contributes to the willingness and capacity of
others to follow suit. Reappropriations engender a 'circulation of struggle.' Most of the successful
land occupations are characterized by alliances between dispossessed women and men which validate
and champion a subsistence political economy. Land poor Kenyans are engaged in an increasingly diverse set of actions aimed at regaining access
to and control over land and resources for subsistence production and trade. This drive confronts the
opposing process of commodification, which is promoted ever more ardently by the Kenyan state as
it is subsumed within the World Trade Organization and its regime of corporate rule. The global
scope of commodification and resistance introduces into Kenya's social movements for subsistence
the universality of 'globalization from below,' and the potential for practical links between struggles
on an international scale. These links are already being made. Wangari Maathai has been a powerful
advocate of environmental reclamation and defense through the Green Belt Movement which
operates in a dozen African countries. The global Jubilee movement for debt repudiation has a branch
in Nairobi. Some joined Mungiki (Congress) after international work experience in war-torn African
countries. After witnessing massive hunger, dispossession and death, they returned to Kenya prepared
to engage in action to prevent such disasters at home. The Organization of Villagers devised a
project in 1997 to send members to South Africa to learn from urban villagers there how to rebuild
slums and register communal land titles. Some land occupiers in Kenya drew inspiration from the
Zimbabwe occupations which began January 2000. These aspects of the international character of Kenya's land occupation movement demonstrate the
ways in which people are organizing 'from below.' This self-organization of the multitude contrasts
sharply with donor-funded aid programs which jet elites from one country to meetings with elites
from other countries. Land occupations in Kenya manifest the direct appropriation by the
dispossessed of the means of production, communication and transport for their own purposes. The
first global congress of landless peoples' movements took place in Honduras in July 2000.
Representatives from 24 countries attended and established the Global Campaign for Agrarian
Reform (Rosset 2001). It is only a matter of time before Kenya's land occupiers join the international
organization of the landless. The 'circulation of struggles' in Kenya has reached an advanced stage. One instance of the reassertion
or defense of subsistence facilitates other instances. In the case of Maragua, farmers who have
reinvented subsistence production are supported by and linked to the dispossessed workers who
defend urban slums and marketplaces in Nairobi. One direct link is through the sale of rural produce
in urban areas. This type of trade is facilitated by the involvement(14) of Mungiki (Congress) in the
transport industry countrywide and by Mungiki's control over several Nairobi city routes (East
African Standard 18 November 2001). The diverse types of land occupations in urban and rural
Kenya are connected by the transport and marketing of subsistence crops in locally controlled markets
and hawking networks. Those involved in strengthening autonomous worker-controlled transport and
marketing of subsistence goods are strengthening subsistence production. Mungiki and the
Organization of Villagers are but two of the well-organized networks which support the elaboration
of the re-emerging subsistence political economy. Each has been involved in land occupations, land
defense and the building up of social and material infrastructure essential to the survival of new
subsistence capacities. Mungiki's (Congress') takeover of local transport routes builds on transport workers' attempt to
unionize the industry in the mid 1980s. The undertaking was banned outright. The new takeover also
builds on the enforcement of the Saba Saba general strike of 1990, during which time youth enforced
compliance by stopping traffic with burning barricades and by dropping stones from overpasses onto
scabbing vehicles. The transport takeover means that Mungiki members can facilitate the movement
of some people and goods (for instance women transporting foodstuffs to markets in the middle of
the night) and deny transport to others. So far, Mungiki bus route occupations have led to lower fares
and more security at bus stops and on public service vehicles. In this way, Mungiki builds on the
socially transformational practice of auto-valuation, or the process by which producers and consumers
negotiate a price that they find mutually acceptable. Auto-valuation is also being implemented by the
rent-striking residents of Kibera (Thuku 29 November 2001). To what extent can the subsistence advances made through land occupations be maintained and
elaborated? To answer this question we consider the gendered class politics of Muungano wa
Wanavijiji (Organization of Villagers) and Mungiki (Congress), the two organisations most deeply
involved in the occupation and defense of land. The Organization of Villagers has taken part in four
of the land occupations reviewed above: Muruoto, Westlands, Soweto and Kamae. It has been
involved in other struggles mounted by slumdwellers and hawkers. Mungiki members have been
directly involved in four of the land occupations and defenses reviewed above. These include Mungiki
members' support for the transport and marketing of subsistence foodstuffs throughout the country,
but specifically in Maragua; their involvement in the defense of those evicted and brutalized in Soweto
and Kamae and their recruitment in the violence-affected regions of Molo, including Githima.
Muungano wa Wanavijiji (Organization of Villagers) and Mungiki (Congress) express the resurgence
of Mau Mau in Kenya in the 21st century. Each organization has tremendous influence on the
direction of change in Kenyan society. The question is, will the Mau Mau resurgence repeat the
mistakes made by the Mau Mau of 50 years ago by settling for 'land for some' instead of 'land for
all'?(15) We consider two indicators of the levels of equality or hierarchy in relations between women and men
in Mungiki and Muungano: the organizations' positions on female education and female genital
mutilation. In Muungano wa Wanavijiji (Organization of Villagers), members support the education
of girls and women (First Woman 25 July 1998). They are also against the practice of female genital
mutilation (First Woman 12 July 1997). Women in many cultures which used to practice female
genital mutilation, have a unique social power to symbolically take away or revoke life, through
guturamira n'gania, or the curse of nakedness. Guturamira n'gania is the act of one or more women
removing their clothing and exposing particularly their vaginas to people who have offended them.
The message communicated in this way is: "This is where your life has come from. We now revoke
your life." One elderly Mau Mau woman member of Muungano wa Wanavijiji galvanized the country
by her use of this "curse," during a hunger strike at Freedom Corner in Nairobi in 1992. Through the
act of exposing her 'warrior marks,' Ruth Wangari Wa Thungu succeeded in repelling police who
were ready to shoot and kill political activists (First Woman 29 May 1996). Women's control over
their own fertility or power to give and revoke life is opposed by genital mutilation which acts to curb
this power. Members of Mungiki (Congress) hold a range of views on female education and mutilation. A Nairobi
human rights activist with close Mungiki ties stated that some Mungiki men do not encourage the
education of women: You know Mungiki is dominated by men and they think the woman should always remain under the husband,
at home, working at women's work, going to the shamba [farm], always under the control of the husband. But
by educating the girl child, she becomes independent and equal and they are against that (First Woman 15
Aug 1998). But other Mungiki members have a more positive approach to girls' education. They claim that in
these "modern times" girls not only need to be educated, but they need to "excel" in their education
(First Woman Mungiki Men 23 July 1998).(16) Some Mungiki (Congress) advocate female genital mutilation while others oppose it. The press has
stated repeatedly that Mungiki forcibly circumcise women. One Sunday Nation report stated that On 21 June 1998, Presbyterian Church of East Africa vowed to fight the sect to the bitter end. Speaking in
Nyeri, Kirimara Presbytery moderator Geoffrey Nyagah and the Rev Linus Kimani Mwangi called for the
immediate arrest of its members. They said the sect leaders were recruiting jobless youth to use them in
"heinous crimes, including forcibly circumcising women. Mungiki is primitive and retrogressive and the
PCEA has vowed to fight it until Jesus returns." They said the sect had instilled fear among women "who now
fear venturing out of doors" (Weru 28 June 1998). Mungiki (Congress) members deny that they forcibly circumcise women (Weru 28 June 1998;
Kareithi 2 July 1998). They claim that such rumors are spread as a means of 'scaring off' women who
might otherwise become members (First Woman Mungiki Men 23 July 1998). Mungiki member
Mwangi Macharia stated that We don't want to be committed to the initiation process itself. What we are committed to, and what we stand
for, is the counseling and advising that used to be imparted on the young initiates as a cultural process of
bringing them into young adulthood. That is what we are now trying to revive and use for the benefit of
mankind (First Woman Mungiki Men 23 July 1998). The socialization into adulthood instils in initiates the positive value of maturity, responsibility and
unity with members of the same age grade. Counselors also advise initiates on the proper conduct of
relations between women and men as well as between one age grade and another (Robertson 1996).
Mungiki member, Njoroge wa Kimunya, suggested that Mungiki sought not mutilation but the
"maturity of the mind," or the "circumcision of the mind." This conceptualization is focused, as
Macharia said, not on the 'cut,' but on the teachings and socialization which, in the past, was
associated with it. Our main focus as regards circumcision is a question of the 'circumcision of the mind' and the maturity of
the mind, the growing up of the mind. And now, if you want to mark it with the physical process, we don't
have a problem with that. Because we even have very many people who are not circumcised and this now
pertains to women. And they are all our daughters, they are all our wives, and we do not have a problem with
that, provided their maturity can be exhibited and it can be shown. It would also look stupid to be physically
circumcised and you are just an imbecile or a dunderhead in your mind. So this thing is a whole question of
how do you carry yourself, how grown up are you, how do you meet the challenges of adulthood when they
call upon you (First Woman Mungiki Men 23 July 1998). These debates within Mungiki increasingly embrace the viewpoints of a multi-ethnic and indeed
international membership. Further complexity was introduced to the debate when the national
coordinator of Mungiki, Ndura Waruinge, and 600 Mungiki members converted to Islam in late 2000
(Nation correspondent 3 December 2000). Members claim to value the diverse means through which
their members mark the passage from childhood to adulthood. In sum, Muungano wa Wanavijiji (Organization of Villagers) explicitly promotes education and land
rights for women, while dismissing genital mutilation as a dangerous and outmoded rite, inimical to
the new culture of resistance and survival. In the past, female genital mutilation tied together an entire
system of community access to land. Widespread landlessness amongst men, then, poses a particular
problem to this system, since much of the material reasoning behind genital mutilation disappears.
Men's dispossession does not immediately imply that women stop marrying, or stop circumcisions.
But the imperative arises for women to engage in squatting and land reappropriations in which they
take control over land themselves. This, in turn, offers an opening through which relations between
women and men around land, sexuality and production are being re-examined and solidarities built
on new bases. Muungano's rejection of mutilation and support for women's education contrasts with Mungiki's
ambiguity. In Mungiki, divergent views contend. Some members are for and some are against
women's education. Most Mungiki support genital mutilation, though they deny using force.(17) Many
Mungiki women, including women from communities who had practiced the rite in the past, are not
circumcised. Mungiki women members are working for universal land rights against those men
members who seek a continuation of the colonial practice of limiting land entitlements to men. Such
a colonial dispensation forces women to be housewives in order to gain access to land. The extent
to which male control over land leads to the establishment of new male deals remains to be seen.
Exclusive male control over land after Mau Mau led directly to the incorporation of men and women
into the international system of commodity production and export. To repeat this mistake would be
to perpetuate the plague of landlessness amongst women and men. Conclusion In this study, we have argued that the struggle for land in Kenya between 1986 and 2002 is a fight
between those who promote capitalist enterprise and those who reassert a subsistence political
economy in concert with others worldwide engaged in popular 'globalization from below.' We have
introduced analytical tools including the 'fight for fertility,' the 'male deal' and the 'gendered class
alliance' to dissect the social anatomy of ten land occupations. Each of the ten cases exhibits
distinctive ownership claims. However similarities in the basis of entitlement claims allow us to sort
the ten cases into three categories according to which kind of 'bundle of entitlements' is most
emphasized by insurgents: British legal, customary or moral. (1) In Maragua, Githima and Kamae,
occupants assert 'British legal claims' to the land. They hold title deeds, or, in the case of Kamae,
Kenyatta granted them ownership of part of his own land. (2) Forest dwellers, squatters on Basil
Criticos' private farm and squatters on the state-owned Agricultural Development Corporation farm
make 'customary claims.' They identify the contested land as indigenous land which had been illicitly
expropriated during the colonial period. (3) In Muruoto, Westlands, Soweto and Mwea, occupants
assert a 'moral claim' to land they have occupied for decades, in the absence of title deeds or claims
of customary entitlement. These categories of entitlements are fluid and contain considerable overlap. It might be argued, for
instance, that those making 'moral claims' to land could in fact refer to aspects of customary law
which enabled those who clear land and make it productive to become the land's 'owners.' In the
homesteading provisions in British law, ownership follows from productive use of un-utilized
property. Yet the distinctions between British law, custom and morality in land occupiers' claims to
land are useful in assessing the outcomes of the on-going land wars. Most successful are those occupations in which the dispossessed defend and elaborate 'British legal
claims' to land. Ongoing conflict engages those who assert 'customary claims' to land. And with the
exception of the tenant rice farmers of Mwea, those making 'moral claims' have been evicted and
constitute a radicalized diaspora. Most of those who have lost their land have squatted elsewhere.
They have joined either Mungiki (Congress) or Muungano wa Wanavijiji (Organization of Villagers)
in self-defense as they organize to rebuild. Kenya's popular land occupations are located within the international movements of globalization
from below and against corporate globalization from above. The rising defense of subsistence
entitlements to land has been met by attempts by international agencies to enforce exploitation. The
World Bank is emphasizing so-called 'land reform' which amounts to new enclosures for capitalist,
export-oriented agricultural. Land occupiers examined in this study reorient agricultural production towards food self-sufficiency
and local marketability. This reorientation counters the conversion of the subsistence political
economy to a capitalist political economy. The centrepiece of the conversion was the enforcement
of coffee and tea contract farming after Independence in 1963. The commodification process was
imposed by "the maximum amount of violence" to extinguish "the institutions and customary laws
that sanction subsistence agriculture" (Seavoy 2000:1, 113).(18) The essential characteristic of the era
of global corporate rule is 'commodification at the point of a gun.' We have argued elsewhere that
violent repression (disguised as 'ethnic clashes') is visited on the dispossessed who try to re-institute
subsistence production, trade and consumption (Turner, Kaara and Brownhill 2001). Land occupiers
are vulnerable to attack by the forces of repression from Kenya backed by the forces of
commodification from abroad. Against the genocidal insanity of corporate rule, Kenyan millenarians(19) defend themselves by
constructing a new society. Land occupiers remember other ways of being. They re-value earlier
means of livelihood which were in harmony with nature and the larger society, rather than at odds
with both. Some elements of a vision of the new society are the revival of women's land rights, the
practice of total land redistribution and the security of trade. The custom of the 'female husband'
allowed widows to avoid destitution and retain their land rights by 'marrying' another woman, whose
own children then inherited the female husband's land (MacKenzie 1998:184). Another remembered
practice that bears on the new land movement is the exercise by young men of the right to periodically
institute a total land redistribution. This practice consisted of a social and environmental 'audit,'
meant to level social inequalities, facilitate environmental sustainability and construct infrastructural
projects. Those who cultivated on steep hillsides, for instance, addressed environmental degradation
by securing less fragile land through the redistribution process. Women's access to water and
fuelwood were thereby ensured. Practices of social protection of the environment and of life are
remembered by the Green Belt Movement's Wangari Maathai: There are some huge trees, wild figtrees, where I grew up, these huge figtrees were never cut, because they
were used as religious sites by our people. ... When I was a child my mother would tell me do not collect any
twigs even from those figtrees. That tree is never cut and even the dry twigs are never burned ... Everywhere
where I had seem any of those huge trees there would be a spring ... So were these trees part of the catchment
system, were these trees part of the water system, was it therefore a mistake to cut these huge trees and instead
plant coffee trees and tea bushes? Did we perhaps dig our own graves by cutting the beautiful trees, which our
ancestors had for some reason protected and made them untouchable so that they would not be destroyed?
(WINGS May 1991). The millenarian vision of a new society centralizes freedom for subsistence production and trade, both
local and long distance. The vision guarantees the means for women traders to travel long distances
in the middle of the night, in order to reach markets with fresh produce by 4:00 or 5:00 in the
morning (First Woman, Mungiki women 24 July 1998). Women traders' safety was ensured in pre-colonial times by "compacts" between ethnic groups "not to molest the womenfolk of either party."
Consequently, even during times of armed conflict, women carried out trade "without interference
or danger" (Thomson 1885:308; Macdonald 1897:110, cited in MacKenzie 1998:47). Mungiki's
takeover of transport is a major step towards facilitating and protecting subsistence trade. In addition
to ensuring "the smooth running of the matatu [minibus public transport] business" Mungiki national
coordinator Ibrahim Ndura Waruinge said in December 2001 that "Mungiki now has a wider plan to
re-settle the landless and displaced people especially those in the Rift Valley following the 1992 tribal
clashes, establish businesses like hawking in major towns and spearhead civic education seminars
ahead of the next year's general election" (Standard Correspondent 4 December 2001). Kenyan land occupiers are working to realize their vision of a new 'subsistence' or life-centred
society. The new social relations that land occupiers are living and defending are an East African
expression of what Bennholdt-Thomsen and Mies call a global "re-invention of the commons,"
characterized by the championing of subsistence, which is: freedom, happiness, self-determination within the limits of necessity - not in some other world but here;
furthermore persistence, stamina, willingness to resist, the view from below, a world of plenty. The concept of self-provisioning is, in our opinion, far too limiting because it refers only to the economical dimension.
'Subsistence' encompasses concepts like 'moral economy,' a new way of life in all its dimensions: economy,
culture, society, politics, language etcetera, dimensions which can no longer be separated from each other
(Bennholdt-Thomsen and Mies 1999: 19). The women involved in land occupations - farmers, tenants, squatters, hawkers and forest dwellers -
fight to control land, the production process and the fruits of their own labour. As these women and
the men in alliance with them make gains in the fight for fertility, they vastly expand and re-invent a
subsistence society. Kenya's Mau Mau resurgence is charting out an alternative, redistributive land
reform process, which is linked to the larger processes of resistance to corporate rule and the building
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for John E. Flint, Hampshire, UK, Palgrave and New York, St. Martin's Press, 2001, p. 172-194. Docname: z:\~Terisa\writing\06 land and oil wars book\cjds-African Jubilee-draftall10 1. "First Woman" is the short name for the East and Southern African Women's Oral History and Indigenous
Knowledge Network, established in 1989. First Woman is a small international network of researchers and life
history providers who have been collecting Mau Mau women's oral histories in East Africa since 1990. In the
1990s and early 2000s, First Woman's action research coincided with the beginning of a new cycle of struggle
constituted by the Mau Mau resurgence. First Woman has interviewed members of social movements and
communities involved in land occupations detailed in this study. Citations of "First Woman" refer to interviews
conducted by members of the network. First Woman thanks the Canadian Social Science and Humanities Research
Council and the Canadian International Development Research Centre for their financial support. 2. " ... the sale of forest land is a big source of patronage for KANU [the ruling party]." and "Plots of land [are] sold cheaply to party favorites and promptly resold, with the profits split between the officials and the [KANU party's] campaign fund" (Africa Confidential 14 September 2001:2). Pallast, 10 October 2001, http://www.gregpalast.com "During the Emergency in the early 1950s, in Kenya's Central Province, groups of men would knock on your front door in the dead of night. When the man of the house asked, 'Who is it?' 'It is us,' would come the reply, and everyone immediately understood that a Mau Mau unit was at the door. Today, some people argue that the name Mungiki taken by a controversial sect whose members are mostly from the Gikuyu community, is derived from the words muingi ki - 'we are the public,' or, not to put too fine a point on it, 'it is us.'" (Githongo 15 November 2000). Some translate the Kiswahili 'Muungano wa Wanavijiji' as "Slumdwellers' Federation." Global Campaign for Agrarian Reform can be contacted through La Via Campesina, www.viacampesina.org and FoodFirst Information Action Network, www.fian.org. Other types exist, such as land occupations by pastoralists, but these fall outside of the scope of this study. In a 1991 speech in San Francisco, Wangari Maathai characterized male dealers as those who "supervise" the syphoning off of Africa's wealth: "The headquarters may be very far from us, but there are tentacles that come that make it very, very difficult for people to break the cycle of poverty. And as long as we do not recognize these tentacles and if we do not recognize the body of these tentacles, we will continue to move in this vicious circle, which is unfortunately being supervised by the very people who should be protecting their people and who should be telling the bodies of the tentacles that 'Now, it's about time you stop sucking my people dry.' That takes a lot of courage, not only for the people who are providing the leadership and who are supervising that syphoning, but also [for] the people like you people here [in San Francisco], for whom the syphoning is being done" (WINGS, May 1991). Two further illustrations of the male deal and its workings against the interests of women, most men, the environment and the local economy, are provided in the case of salt manufacturers in Malindi and Tana River and the case of Tiomin in Kwale. In the first case, the court has ordered 6,500 people in Malindi and Tana River to stop "encroaching" on 3,835 hectares of land that they have lived on since 1875. The land has been allocated to two salt manufacturing companies, Kemu Salt Packers and Suleiman Enterprise. Residents have challenged the allocation of the prime land by Commissioner of Lands, Sammy Mwaita (Nation Correspondent 20 November 2001). Mwaita, the owners of the salt manufacturing firms and the judge who decided in the capitalists' favour would be classified as the 'male dealers' in this case. Immediately after the court case, violence broke out in the Tana River area, during which 120 house were burned and 14 people shot dead. The victims plan to sue the government for failing to "take responsibility" (Mango 4 December 2001). In the second case, farmers in Kwale are being forced off of their ancestral land in favour of a mining corporation. Tiomin is a Canadian corporation which, with the involvement of a Kenyan Cabinet minister, is expropriating land from residents of Kwale to establish a titanium mining industry (Nation Reporter 15 November 2001). The Kwale farmers' struggle for subsistence and against commodification has gained international support and is, in this sense, a critical link in Kenya's involvement in 'globalization from below' (Drillbits & Tailings 28 February 2001). The "Cabinet Minister" is the 'male dealer.' Tiomin owners and stockholders are Canadian and other foreign capitalists. Mwea supplied nearly 80% of Kenya's domestic consumption. The government-owned National Irrigation Board milled and delivered it throughout Kenya. The parallel market requires an alternative transport system which is run by people willing to carry out illicit trade in what is a crucial staple food supply. One Mwea woman ran a fleet of matatus in the mid 1990s. During the Christmas season in 1996, retailers reported low sales, but "hawkers appeared to do a roaring business, selling mostly toys, garments and second hand items. ... [retail] traders appealed to the Mayor to check the influx of hawkers 'who are severely undercutting us ... We pay lots of tax but our business is not protected,' Mr. Shah said." (Waihenya and Katana 22 December 1996). And: "Hawkers have invaded every corner of the city - to the extent of blocking entrances to rent-paying, rate-paying and tax-paying shops. The all too common battles between the city askaris [guards] and the hawkers have failed to solve this problem" (Shah 30 October 1996). 12. A year later in December 1997, and just a few weeks before the General Election, President Moi invited
women's groups from Nairobi to State House for a reception. He allocated ten acres of land in Kayole to some 130
women's groups in Nairobi, including the Soweto National Choir. The ten acres was divided between the groups
into tiny .075 acre plots. "We ululated and danced that our dream had become a reality. Almost immediately, the
PC [Provincial Commissioner] set everything in motion," stated Mary Ayoti, a leader of the Soweto National Choir
(Mwangi 8 October 2001). Ayoti said that within no time, they got allotment letters and maps showing where their
plots were. They later paid the premiums. Each group paid a service fee of Sh30,000. But the women never
received title deeds. By November 2001, the land was being claimed by someone else. Former Nairobi Provincial
Commissioner Joseph Kaguthi said that he was "sure that some corrupt people colluding with some City Hall
officials had taken over the land and sold it." The money too, he said, "may have gone into the pockets of a few
individuals leaving the women with a double loss" (Mwangi 8 October 2001).
Some City Council guards disagree with the harassment of hawkers. One stated that he carries civilian
clothes with him so that in case he in embroiled in a 'war' with the hawkers, he can quickly change his clothing
and escape the fracas (First Woman 12 July 1998).
In an interview with a reporter from the East African Standard newspaper, Mungiki's national coordinator
stated that "We, as Mungiki, have 500 matatus operating in the various routes in this country. We have two buses.
We have 1,230 taxi cabs and we have 6,000 mikokoteni (handcarts). So we have all the reason to be involved in the
matatu industry. Again about 90 per cent of matatu drivers are Mungiki people. Ninety-nine per cent of the
touts/conductors are Mungiki members. Six-five per cent of matatu owners are Mungiki members" (East African
Standard 18 November 2001).
15. " |